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GERRIT K. KIMSMA and EVERT VAN LEEUWEN
Important bioethcs changes are underway in the Netherlands that carry, for
better or worse, far-reaching social consequences. The two major areas of
change involve (1) economics and containing soaring health costs and (2)
end-of-life care as reflected in several high-profile cases: in a decision handed
down by the Dutch Supreme Court on reviewing the procedures for the
termination of life, in the discussion surrounding The Groningen Protocol and
the active ending of lives in neonatology, and in a report of a Royal Dutch
Medical Society’s Committee on the role of physicians in ending life in cases of
requests to die outside the area of terminal diseases.
Each of these events and reports is described in broad outline below.
Economics
An appeal to Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” as a solution for rising health care
costs?1 For the past decades soaring healthcare costs have become a major
source of worry for governments, institutions, and individuals in all Western
countries. In response, Dutch politics has moved away from state-controlled
socialized welfare by distancing state involvement, by delegating the manage-
ment and control of social tasks to the direct stakeholders, and by converting
former state institutions into private enterprises, thus creating a “government
at a distance” policy. Successive governments, formed by Liberals, Social
Democrats, and Christian Democrats, have made a significant departure from
the traditional two-tiered system of healthcare insurance introduced during the
Second World War that was modeled after the German system. Until now there
has been mandatory insurance for lower income groups and voluntary insur-
ance for the higher income classes.
Several changes with moral significance for the system have already been
decided or are intended for future implementation. The concept of “solidarity”
as the basis for payment (i.e., the plan in which people pay a fee commensurate
with their risk and the funds collected are sufficient to cover expenditures but
produce no profit) is being replaced. Instead, the new plan is for a system of
obligated insurance that provides a basket of basic primary healthcare provi-
sions, with options for individuals to get supplemental coverage for risks not
otherwise covered. Thus, there is a shift away from state-centered responsibility
in which the state controls the price of healthcare premiums in contrast to the
market setting the price without government interference. Not-for-profit insti-
tutions have become for profit, more or less like making the foxes responsible
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for guarding the chicken coop. This combination of individualization and
commercialization is the latest expression of the liberal ideology of individual
responsibility, in the European sense, and faith in market mechanisms. The
intended and hoped for effects are competition in the formerly nonprofit
section of public life and a lowering of costs or at least more resistance toward
the usual open-ended funding of healthcare provisions. This “invisible hand”
ideology of Adam Smith is partly driven by the need to be more competitive
in the European and international markets, requiring a general reduction of
production costs and, subsequently, a lowering of the cost of insurance coverage.
Two of the most visible expressions of these changes are the introduction in
2005 of Diagnostic Related Groups (DRGs) in hospital-provided care and the
introduction of a “no claim” system for individuals. The expectation of DRGs
as a cost-containment measure would seem questionable after its failure in the
United States.
The introduction of a “no claim” measure seems a definite farewell to
solidarity, because the rationale is that nonusers of healthcare will receive a
rebate if and when few or no claims for healthcare have been made. The idea
behind this move is to weed out “unnecessary” use of healthcare provisions, as
if expressing complaints and claims for help are matters of conscious choice,
comparable to buying goods in the marketplace. This threshold works against
those people whose healthcare needs are not elective but required: the chron-
ically ill, the very young, and the elderly. The first effect of this “no claim”
scheme has been a rise in health insurance costs for all individuals, regardless
of their health status.
End of Life
There have been three landmark events. First, the Dutch Supreme Court
(“Hoge Raad”) upheld a conviction by a lower court of a family physician who
ended the life of an 85-year-old terminal patient, without the presence of a
request and with the incorrect medication. The message of the Court was clear,
and the limits of the law on “Review procedures for the termination of life on
request and assisted suicide etc.” were upheld, as expected. This decision is
noteworthy because it is only the fourth decision on interventions at the end of
life by the Hoge Raad, and it reaffirms the position that the request of the
patient is fundamental in cases of ending lives.
Second, there was a brief but intense wave of reaction when it became public
that in 2004 the Beatrix Paediatric Clinic of the Groningen Academic Medical
Center had ended the lives of four neonates, using a protocol and having
discussed the cases with the legal authorities without ensuing prosecution. The
protocol, called the “Groningen Protocol,” comes as the result of decades of
debate, both inside and outside the Netherlands.2
Steps taken in the Groningen Protocol are an attempt to resolve a dilemma
that has been widely recognized by pediatricians and law enforcement officers,
that is, the existence of a group of extremely premature neonates who remain
viable after intensive treatment, sometimes despite decisions not to treat, but
whose condition is one of hopeless suffering, without prospects for any sort of
independent life.3 The medical diagnoses of the neonates were severe brain
damage from bleeding, extreme spina bifida, and epidermolysis bullosa, an
extreme, lethal blistering disease of the skin.
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The announcement of the protocol has come in a period where the original
intention was to plan a national review committee in the area of life-ending
interventions for incompetent patients: neonates and young children, severely
retarded people, and comatose patients. It appears that this committee will not
be convened for some time to come and thus the problem is left with the
medical profession. The Groningen Protocol can be seen as an expression of the
direction in which “the field” is moving.
In Groningen the decision has been made to report all cases of actively
ending a life to the legal authorities, thus making a choice for transparency,
based on previous court cases of Prins, Kadijk, the Law on Review Procedures
for the Termination of Life on Request or Assisted Suicide (2002), and profes-
sional policy reports of the Royal Dutch Medical Association (RDMA) and the
Dutch Society of Paediatricians.
The Protocol specifies the following procedural steps: Following the active
termination of the life of a neonate, the physician in charge submits an
extensive report to the local medical coroner, as no certificate of natural death
can be written. The coroner inspects the body, informs the local prosecutor, and
hands over the physician’s report. The prosecutor checks the facts of the case
against the law and jurisprudence, then writes an opinion about the main
issues, with advice for the chief prosecutor. He then reports the case to the
national prosecutors, who meet regularly. It is this group that decides on the
basis of the facts, the advice, and their combined view whether to prosecute
or not. The final decision is made by the Secretary of Justice. In the last cases,
the process extended over a period of approximately 5 months.
The 15 pages of the protocol, version 29/9/2004, reflect the intentions for
transparency and accountability in each step of the procedure, noting all the
details of the process, and taking into account the responsibility of all the par-
ticipants, including the child’s parents and their views.
For some people this protocol is a sure sign of a steeper slide down the
slippery slope of active euthanasia in the Netherlands; for others it is a brave
effort to deal responsibly with the realities of medicine and the law that fall
outside the usual medical and legal categories.
The third important recent development in Dutch bioethics is the publication
in December 2004 of a report with the long title “Searching for Norms for
Physician Intervention When Help Is Requested to End Life in Case of Emo-
tional Suffering.” The report is produced by a Commission of the RDMA,
chaired by Prof. J.H. Dijkhuis, a psychologist, in the wake of the “Brongersma
Case,” concerning the active termination of life of an 86-year-old man by his
physician in 1998.
Some details of the case are necessary to understand the deliberations of the
Commission, the report’s conclusions, and the broader issues in the Dutch
societal debate. For years, Brongersma, an elderly, single man, had wrestled
with a number of common predicaments of the elderly, social, existential, and
physical. For him life was meaningless. Over a long period of time, he asked
his family physician, Sutorius, to help him die. After going through the
procedure of securing second opinions from a colleague family physician and
a psychiatrist, who both concurred but on different grounds, he terminated his
patient’s life and reported it to the authorities.
In successive court procedures in a lower court, a higher court, and the
Dutch Supreme Court, the legal question centered on two issues: the presence
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of a medical disease falling within the “medical domain,” as it was called, and
the presence of a situation of “force majeure,” a situation of emergency, in
Dutch a noodtoestand. In this circumstance the physician is faced with a dilemma
in which he feels he really has no other choice but to respond to the duty to
alleviate suffering versus the duty to protect life.
The Supreme Court clearly ruled for limiting justifiable physician involve-
ment in voluntary active euthanasia or assisted suicide to those cases where
there is the existence of a disease that causes unbearable suffering. The court
did not recognize the legitimacy of ending life in cases of loss of physical
function in old age and existential feelings of the lack of meaning in life. Doubt
remained in these latter cases about whether the suffering could be verified
medically even though it was experienced as unbearable.
The Court’s opinion was received with ambivalence, both inside and outside
the medical profession.4 The argument of the medical domain was viewed as
inconsistent on two grounds. First, the medical domain usually is not con-
ceived as a fixed entity, but shaped by time and culture. Second, also inconsis-
tent was the stipulation that although existential anguish can be a reality of life
addressed by physicians, at the same time, according to the Court’s decision,
they are not permitted “to form a judgment concerning whether the qualities of
that suffering are unbearable, hopeless or incurable.”
The assignment of the RDMA’s Dijkhuis Commission was to answer the
following questions:
1. Are there inherent limits to the present manner of legitimizing life-ending
interventions by a physician? If so, what are these limits? What does that
imply for the justification of the interventions of physicians in those cases
where the patients’ request for help to end life is based primarily in their
loss of the will to live due to loss of companionship, physical disabilities,
and generally reduced overall function.
2. Is there, in the light of this analysis, reason for either adaptation or exten-
sion of the presently accepted norms and rules concerning help to end life
after a request? If so, how and in what direction?
The answers of the report reflect both the ambivalence toward the Brong-
ersma case and the lack of professional consensus in medicine. It appears,
based on the information of invitational conferences with various groups of
physicians, that the number of requests in these cases, existential suffering
without an incurable medical disease, is very low. Physicians tend to be hesi-
tant in recognizing issues of existential suffering as falling within the domains
of legitimate termination of life, and, if there are cases, they are usually consid-
ered “borderline cases.” There appears to be a lack of consistent appreciation
and assessment of that particular type of suffering.
Four options are described in the report’s conclusion:
• the choice for a strict limitation to the medical professional domain
• an extended, but not limitless professional domain
• a domain that is shared by different professional caretakers
• the choice for assisted suicide outside of the medical profession.
The commission’s advice to the RDMA is a choice for the second option with
the following arguments:
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1. Unbearable and hopeless suffering is not confined to people with a
classifiable somatic or psychic disorder.
2. The present legal demarcation does not solve the practical problems and is
a denial of the complexity (of the assessment) of suffering.
3. A certain weight must be given to the different ways in which physicians
see their role and tasks in these issues.
4. In the future it is to be expected that there will be an increase rather than
a decrease of this type of request.
The Commission ends its report with a plea for loosening the strict limits of
the Hoge Raad, based on the reality that physicians and others are involved in
caring for people with existential suffering, even though the instruments for
assessing this condition are undeveloped and not based on consensus. Yet the
Commission pleads also for a certain limited space for developments to
integrate “suffering of life” in the present procedures. That is possible within
the confinements of the present law. The law stipulates that physicians need to
assess unbearable and hopeless suffering, but does not prescribe how this
assessment should take place.
The Commission’s recommendations to the RDMA are in line with these
suggestions:
1. to promote continued debate on the legitimate limits of the physicians’
role in requests to end life
2. to develop procedural guidelines to deal with borderline cases within the
present legal context
3. to work with other caretakers and their organizations to develop needed
expertise for these cases, including options for support and consultation
4. to recognize the diversity of opinions and responses among physicians in
dealing with requests to assist in ending life in cases of this kind
5. to participate actively in the social debate about the options for assisted
suicide and the clarification of the role of physicians’ participation
6. to be advised on a yearly basis by a permanent commission in this area
and establish policy on the basis of their recommendations.
Conclusion
Heinrich Heine once said that he would go to the Netherlands when the world
comes to an end, because everything in this country happens 50 years later. We
have come a long way from Heine’s assessment of the Dutch. Certainly much
is going on in the Low Countries, but it is debatable whether the direction is
forward or backward.
In the healthcare system, developments seem to be shifting away from
traditional welfare systems based on social cohesion, taking a distanced approach
from solidarity as a guiding social principle, and embracing competition and
“the marketplace.” In the area of end-of-life care, the Dutch seem to continue
their particular brand of dealing with the issue that all persons are mortal and
that individuals should have the option to give form and substance to the
ending of their life.
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